We are pleased to announce that our work, improving on side-channel analysis techniques, has been published in the Journal of Cryptographic Engineering.

Along with this paper, we are sharing one of the dataset of our experiments, made available on our gitlab repository. It is comprised of electromagnetic side-channel traces of a SW AES implementation, that runs on STM32F4 microcontroller (Cortex-M4), along with a notebook that details the acquisition campaign. The target implementation makes use of Boolean masking and a shuffling of the SubBytes operation order to protect against side-channel attacks to a certain extent.

Initially, the intent was to provide a point of comparison for side-channel attacks with or without operation shuffling countermeasure, and study the practicality of our technique against shuffled implementations.

Now, our goal is to motivate security experts and researchers to further develop our ideas. For that, we invite you to have a look at the dataset and try to attack it on your own!

In these traces, side-channel leakage is relatively strong, there is no clock jitter, and plenty of points of interest... Yet due to masking and shuffling, the information is spread over quite a lot of time-samples.

What would be your approach to tackle this issue? How efficient could your attack be? In terms of number of traces required, but also distinguishability of the secret key, and ease of use of the technique...

In a follow-up blogpost, we are willing to share our results on this reference use-case, along with findings proposed by the community. Feel free to email us at contact@eshard.com with your ideas and results!

‍